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Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone
Calls and the Right of Privacy
Mark S. Nadelt
"So that is the telephone. It rings and you run." This early description
of the telephone by the artist Degas1 still rings true today. So strong is
this Pavlovian response that, reportedly, a person standing on a building
ledge, ready to jump to his death, returned to his building to answer his
telephone.2 As one court has remarked, "A ringing telephone is an imper-
ative which, in the minds of many, must be obeyed with a prompt
answer.
' s
This compelling quality has made the telephone a desirable medium for
disseminating information.4 The device has spawned a rapidly growing
billion dollar industry which includes "telemarketing," 5 phone surveying,
and soliciting by phone. Yet, consumer reactions to unsolicited telephone
calls vary. A survey conducted for Pacific Telephone indicated that many
recipients did not mind survey, solicitation, or sales calls." Others,
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1. Fadiman, Please Tap My Line, I Like It!, HOLIDAY, July 1964, at 17, quoted in Note,
Unwanted Telephone Calls-A Legal Remedy?, 1967 UrAH L. REV. 379, 380 n.4.
2. M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 176 (1964).
3. People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91, 96 (Colo. 1979).
4. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Reach Out and Sell Something, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 1984, at 127; Schnei-
der, Telemarketing As A Promotional Tool-Its Effects and Side Effects, 2 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 29
(Winter 1985).
5. See sources cited supra note 4. Telemarketing, selling by phone, is already replacing door-to-
door sales and direct mail for many tasks. Many businesses using telemarketing recognize that "alter-
native advertising media [are] much less effective than telephone solicitation." Unsolicited Telephone
Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1027 (1980). See also Planned Parenthood League v. Attorney Gen., 391
Mass. 709, 715, 464 N.E.2d 55, 59 (1984) ("The parties agree that telephone solicitation is a much
more effective way of procuring contributions than direct mail requests"). This is due, in part, to the
increasing availability and decreasing cost of automatic dialer recorded message players (ADRMPs).
ADRMPs sell for as little as $500 and can complete as many as 100 calls an hour. Smith, Dial 'N'
for Nuisance, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 42D, col. 1.
6. The Field Research Report, commissioned by Pacific Telephone Company, reported that 0.1%
of the respondents "liked" receiving calls made by sales people and 0.2% liked calls soliciting money
for charitable purposes. 1.7% reported favorable feelings with respect to calls asking for their vote or
support for a political candidate, and 3.7% liked calls made by interviewers in authentic public opin-
ion surveys. In addition, for categories of sales, charitable solicitations, political solicitations, and opin-
ion polls, 9.1%, 27.1%, 43.4%, and 50.2%, respectively, answered that they "did not mind" receiving
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however, found so called "junk"' calls annoying, particularly when the
calls were made by automatic dialer recorded message players
(ADRMPs).' In the survey just mentioned, 25.1% of the respondents con-
sidered unsolicited sales calls an invasion of privacy.' In 1985 the Wash-
ington legislature reached the same conclusion.10 That year, a survey in
Washington state indicated that 75% of all respondents favored some form
of regulatory action against unsolicited calls, and half of those favored
prohibition of all unsolicited calls. 1
Unsolicited callers reply to those irritated by unsolicited calls by sug-
gesting two simple remedies: taking the phone off the hook or hanging up
quickly on unwanted calls. Unfortunately, neither is adequate. Taking the
telephone off the hook is not a viable option for those reluctant to miss
other calls, and the opportunity to hang up does not satisfy those dragged
out of the shower or otherwise disturbed." Many of the estimated 13.9%
of consumers with unlisted telephone numbers13 may have sought that ref-
uge to protect themselves from such calls. Yet even they are not protected
from callers using lists compiled from sources other than the phone book
or made by sequential dialers (machines which dial telephone numbers
consecutively).
This Article discusses what actions might be taken to ensure the privacy
of those who want it while protecting the rights to free speech of those
such calls. Field Research Corp., The California Public's Experience With and Attitude Toward
Unsolicited Telephone Calls 9 (Mar. 1978) (unpublished report prepared for the Pacific Telephone
Company on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation) [hereinafter Field Report].
A study conducted by Simmons Market Research Bureau in 1984 for the Direct Marketing Associ-
ation noted that "51% of [recipients of telephone sales messages] listen to the complete message, 42%
cut off the speaker sometimes, and only 7% hang up consistently." Fannin, Will New Laws Hang Up
Teleinarketers?, MARKErIN; & ME:DIA DECISIONS, May 1985, at 47, 48.
7. This term is suggested by the similarity of unsolicited calls to "junk" mail. The FCC even used
this term in the title of its 1978-80 inquiry into the subject. See Unsolicited Telephone Calls ("Junk
Phone Calls") 67 F.C.C.2d 1384 (1978).
8. The Field survey indicated that this group consisted of 86.9%, 65.4%, 46.3%, and 37.1% of
respondents, respectively, for categories of sales calls, charitable solicitations, political solicitations, and
opinion polls. Moreover, 60.9% found ADRMP calls "very annoying." Field Report, supra note 6, at
9.
9. See Field Report, supra note 6, at 18.
10. Act of Apr. 22, 1985, ch. 121, § 1, 1985 Wash. Legis. Serv. 315 (West). The legislature also
found that its current laws regulating unsolicited phone calls do not adequately protect the privacy of
telephone subscribers. Id.
11. The survey was administered to a representative sample of residential subscribers by Ebasco
Business Consultant Company. WASHINGTON UTILITIFS ANt) TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
REGULATION OF TE.I.EPHONE SOLICrrATION IN WASHINGTON STATE 21-25 (1985) [hereinafter
WASHINGTON REPORT].
12. Nor are telephone answering machines an adequate solution. One New York psychologist was
flabbergasted when she turned on her answering machine reserved for patients' messages to find that a
sales pitch for burglar alarms had appropriated half of her 30-minute tape and cut off some patients'
calls. Newsday, Mar. 8, 1984, § 2 at 7.
13. Roman, Telephone: The Growing Medium, in FAcT BoOK ON DIRE(-Tr MARKErING 133
(1985 ed.) (statistics compiled for 1981-82).
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who benefit from unsolicited calls. Part I reviews the constitutional issues
involved when regulators and legislators attempt to protect privacy by
restricting expression. These issues include the strength of the right of
privacy, which is determined by the forum and nature of the communica-
tion, and the First Amendment requirement that any regulation be nar-
rowly tailored and not content- or speaker-based. Part II reviews some
existing and proposed means of regulating unsolicited calls. This type of
regulation involves five major issues: defining unsolicited calls, distinguish-
ing among different types of unsolicited calls, restricting the hours of the
calls, allocating the costs of regulation, and determining whether regula-
tion should be state- or federally-imposed. Part III discusses solutions to
the problem of unsolicited calls. After reviewing existing alternatives, two
types of solutions are proposed. The first is a no solicitation directory to
identify those telephone subscribers who do not want unsolicited calls
from unsolicited callers. The second type of solution uses telephone tech-
nology in one of two ways-either to create the telephone equivalent of a
"no solicitors" sign or to allow individuals to block calls from designated
telephone numbers.
I. Constitutional Law: Privacy Versus Freedom of Expression
The constitutional right of privacy supports regulation protecting indi-
viduals against undesired unsolicited phone calls. The First Amendment,
however, protects the speech of the callers,14 including the commercial
speech of the telemarketers. 6 The right to receive information is also pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 6 Remedies to the problem of undesired
unsolicited calls must thus balance privacy interests against free expres-
sion interests.
A. The Privacy Interest
The reasonableness of a restriction on speech to protect privacy depends
to a great extent on the strength of the privacy interest involved. Decisions
in this area have identified two factors for measuring the strength of the
claimed privacy interest: the forum in which the challenged communica-
tion is received and the nature of the communication. Privacy interests are
strongest in the home. Privacy interests also provide strong protection
against blaring aural communication that cannot be avoided easily but
provide relatively little protection from innocuous visual messages.
14. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I ("Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.
15. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding
school board's removal of books from school library unconstitutional).
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Courts have consistently held that an individual's privacy right is para-
mount when he is at home,1" and the government may legislate to protect
against disturbing communications. As the Supreme Court recently
explained:
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men
and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily
pursuits, is surely an important value . ... The State's interest in
protecting the well being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society. 8
The Supreme Court has often stated that "a man's home is his castle" 9
and has stressed that "in the privacy of the home . . . the individual's
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder."2O
The second factor affecting the importance of privacy interests is the
nature of the communication. The Supreme Court has noted that visual
communication is less intrusive than aural communication because those
who do not desire to receive the visual messages can "effectively avoid
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes."" Similarly, disturbing mail may be disposed of easily. As the
17. Cases involving communications directed at individuals outside their homes are of limited rele-
vance to the issue of privacy against telephone calls because courts have held that individuals lose a
significant degree of their privacy rights when they venture outside their homes, where the right of
expression is generally dominant and individuals are usually expected to avoid any messages they find
disturbing. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 n.27 (1978); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREE-
DOM OF SPEIECH § 1.02[F][21[dI (1984); but see F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE S(X:IETY
146 (1981) (finding such cases highly relevant). However, when "the degree of captivity makes it
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure," Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975), the Court may recognize significant privacy interests even outside the home
under the "captive audience" doctrine. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03
(1974) (plurality opinion) (upholding municipal policy forbidding political advertising in city public
transit vehicles).
18. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973). This maxim was coined by
Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634). THE OXFORD DICTrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS s.v. E. Coke (3d ed.
1979).
20. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397
U.S. 728 (1970)) (supporting FCC determination that certain language in daytime radio broadcast
was indecent). Professor Chaffee has stated that "[gireat as is the value of exposing citizens to novel
views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he
desires." Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATFS 406 (1948). Professor Stone acknowl-
edged the irony of "making the closed mind a principal feature of the open society." Stone, Fora
Americana, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 262 (quoting H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND rHE FIRST
AMENDMENT 159 (1965)).
21. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975). It is true that in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), a
plurality of the Court held that riders viewing advertising placards in a streetcar were not free to turn
away. Justice Blackmun, the author of the plurality opinion, has since interpreted the case as turning
on the "captive audience" problem. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556
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Supreme Court stated, "[T]he short, though regular, journey from
mailbox to trash can . . . is an acceptable burden.""2 Mail waits passively
for the recipient's attention, and undesired mail can generally be screened
almost automatically.
Unsolicited calls are intrinsically more intrusive than mail and other
forms of visual communication. As Professor Franklyn Haiman has noted,
"[Tihe intrusion on others created by sound, especially when it is ampli-
fied electronically, is far more troublesome" than that created by visual
communication .2  Furthermore, like door-to-door solicitations,"' telephone
calls are on the active end of an active-passive spectrum since they virtu-
ally compel a reaction from anyone with a telephone. Intrusive communi-
cation provides greater justification for regulating the communicator than
more passive communication. Since unsolicited phone calls reach the indi-
vidual in his or her home and are aural rather than visual, they are espe-
cially appropriate candidates for regulation.
B. General Principles of Regulation of Speech
After identifying privacy interests of a sufficient magnitude, a regulator
must meet First Amendment standards in choosing a remedy. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that content- or speaker-based regu-
lations will not be tolerated.2" Any permit process for speakers will be
closely scrutinized to ensure that government officials are not given the
discretion to discriminate covertly on the basis of subject matter.26
The time, place, or manner of the speech may be regulated when the
regulation furthers a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to the
speech's content. For example, courts have upheld reasonable limitations
(1975). See also M. NIMMER, supra note 17, at 1-35. Professor Haiman suggests that the description
of the offensive placards in Lehman as the "blare of political propaganda" indicates that the Court
considered the ads comparable to aural stimuli in their intrusiveness. F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW
IN A FREE ScET-r 146 (1981) (quoting and adding emphasis to Lehman).
22. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Lamont v. Comm'r of
Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
23. F. HAtMAN, supra note 21, at 157.
24. Both municipalities and the Supreme Court have recognized the intrusiveness of door-to-door
solicitors. As the Court has noted: "[Ujnwanted knocks on the door by day or night are a nuisance, or
worse, to peace and quiet." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626-27 (1951).
25. See Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 57-62 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
26. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (ordinance requiring permission of
city manager to distribute circulars held unconstitutional). The courts will also closely examine any
system which allows government officials to treat speakers differently based on subjective categoriza-
tions. In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946), for example, the postmaster determined
postage rates for various publications based upon his determination of whether a particular
publication "contributed to the public good and public welfare." The Supreme Court invalidated the
procedure, holding that such unreviewable discretion could not be vested in a government regulator.
27. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ordinance forbidding use of sound trucks in
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on the hours for door-to-door solicitation. 8 Such restrictions cannot be
imposed, however, if other similarly disruptive communications remain
unregulated.2 9 If restrictions do not reach all communications having simi-
lar qualities, they will be examined by the courts to determine the sincer-
ity of the interests that regulators claim to protect.
C. Balancing the Rights of Privacy and Free Speech
While privacy interests may prevail over speech interests in the homes
of recipients, cases in this area indicate that further inquiry is often neces-
sary to determine the legality of a particular piece of protective legislation.
In particular, the courts have expressed concern over the extent to which
regulations prevent communicators from reaching willing recipients.
Courts seek to ascertain whether or not more narrowly tailored remedies
or less drastic means are available to achieve the regulatory goals in
question.
Such inquiries have led courts to prescribe different regulatory stan-
dards depending on the medium of communication at issue. Since restric-
tions on broadcast media such as radio, television, or sound trucks limit
the dissemination of messages to both unwilling and willing recipients,
they are more difficult for courts to justify.30 On the other hand, courts
are more receptive to restrictions on point-to-point media, including mail
and phone communications, because such restrictions need not prevent dis-
semination of messages to willing recipients. For example, while the
courts have been unwilling to accept absolute bans on communication by
mail,3" the Supreme Court upheld a statute 2 that permits those individu-
als disturbed by "erotically arousing or sexually provocative" mail to
public streets).
28. See, e.g., McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp 766, 776 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (upholding 6 p.m.
curfew as reasonable time, place, and manner regulation); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F.
Supp. 862, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (portion of ordinance limiting hours of house-to-house religious
solicitation not unconstitutionally overbroad); but see Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) (requirement that charities not using 75% of their solicited funds for
"charitable purposes" be banned from door-to-door solicitation held unconstitutional); Citizens for a
Better Env't v. Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. IIl. 1980) (restricted hours
did not establish reasonable deadlines for municipal action regarding permits).
29. See, e.g., Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Town of Southington, 508 F. Supp. 43, 47
(D. Conn. 1980) (6 p.m. curfew on door-to-door canvassers struck down where ice cream trucks were
allowed to sell in same neighborhoods after 6 p.m.).
30. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 766 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); M. NiM-
MEit, supra note 17, at 1-29.
31. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (striking down ban on mail
advertising of contraceptives).
32. See Postal Revenue and Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 645 (codified as
amended at 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1967), current version at 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1982)). See also Note,
Federal Pandering Advertisements Statute: The Right of Privacy Versus the First Amendment, 32
OHio S'r. L.J. 149 (1971).
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enlist the help of the post office to prevent further mailings. 3 It was held
that no First Amendment right was breached because the act did not
restrict the reception of messages by willing recipients.
Similarly, the Court has invalidated blanket restrictions on door-to-door
canvassing, noting that a provision allowing the prosecution of canvassers
who ignored "no solicitors" signs would protect those residents who did
not want to be disturbed, while safeguarding the interests of those who
wished to receive the communication.3 4
Reasoning from the cases discussed above, one could conclude that the
Court would not be likely to tolerate broad bans on unsolicited telephone
calls. As with mail and door-to-door solicitations, it is possible that less
drastic solutions exist which do not prevent communication to willing re-
cipients through unsolicited calls."6
D. Regulation of Unsolicited Telephone Calls in the Courts
Like statutes restricting door-to-door and mail solicitations, laws
prohibiting annoying telephone calls have been attacked on First Amend-
ment grounds. After determining whether the statutes are drawn to pro-
tect the fundamental interest in privacy, 6 the courts have gone on to scru-
tinize statutes to ensure that they are not so drastic as to inhibit free
speech unnecessarily."
Courts generally have enforced this standard by requiring that regula-
tions restricting telephone calls "directly advance the governmental
interest [in privacy] in the least intrusive fashion to serve the particular
interest." 8 In addition, courts have characterized statutes regulating
33. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Martin
v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943) (law prohibiting ringing doorbell or knocking unnecessarily
"substitutes the judgment of the community for the judgment of the individual householder").
35. Rules restricting expression in order to protect privacy also arise in the context of labor rela-
tions. In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966), the NLRB required
employers to disclose the names and addresses of employees prior to union elections. In upholding the
Excelsior rule against suggestions that employees have a right to be free of political propaganda, the
courts held that employees may not be contacted if they declare their desire not to be contacted. See
NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F.2d 1247, 1250 (3d Cir. 1969) (although lists of employees
would be disclosed to candidate unions, "the employee retains the right to insulate himself against
offensive solicitation").
36. See, e.g., State v. Elder, 382 So.2d 687, 692-93 (Fla. 1980) (upholding statute criminalizing
anonymous phone calls made with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass); Planned Parenthood
League v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 709, 715, 464 N.E.2d 55, 61 (1984) (invalidating statute because
it did "virtually nothing to promote the State's alleged substantial interest in residential privacy").
37. See, e.g., People v. Klick, 66 II1. 2d 269, 274, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (1977) (statute
criminalizing making of phone calls with intent to annoy unconstitutionally overbroad); State v.
Dronso, 90 Wis. 2d 110, 117, 279 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (invalidating statute
regulating phone calls on the ground that "there are times when citizens make legitimate calls with
the intent to annoy the recipient of the call").
38. Optimist Club v. Riley, 563 F. Supp. 847, 849 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (enjoining amendment to
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annoying telephone calls as regulating conduct, not speech, 9 and have dis-
missed challenges of vagueness when these statutes contain specific intent
requirements. 0 The Supreme Court has not yet been called upon to de-
termine the validity of these kinds of statutes. In dicta, however, the Court
has expressed its sympathy with legislators attempting to limit harassment
by phone: "One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option
does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has
already taken place . . . . [T]he problem of harassing phone calls is
hardly hypothetical. 14 '
II. Current Regulation and the Key Issues
This Part reviews existing and proposed regulatory solutions to the
problem of unsolicited phone calls. It then discusses some of the difficult
problems such solutions must overcome.
A. Existing and Proposed Regulations
Forty-five states have laws that prohibit harassment by telephone calls
made with the purpose, intent, or knowledge that the call will annoy.42 In
addition, some states specifically prohibit calls made at "inconvenient
hours"43 or calls which impair the ability of the person called to use his or
her phone. 44
North Carolina statute making it unlawful to solicit charitable contributions by telephone because less
restrictive registration scheme protecting against fraud existed). See also Planned Parenthood League
v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 709, 464 N.E.2d 55 (1984) (holding statute unconstitutional prohibiting
charitable solicitation through paid operators); City of Everett v. Moore, 37 Wash. App. 862, 865,
683 P.2d 617, 619 (1984) (striking down as overbroad ordinance proscribing communication by tele-
phone causing annoyance or alarm).
States have attempted to satisfy this least intrusive means standard by carefully limiting the reach of
their telephone harassment statutes. See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 534 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Mo. App.
1976) (limiting scope of statute to calls made "solely to harass"); Schuster v. State, 450 S.W.2d 616
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (excluding from state statute calls made "for a lawful business purpose").
39. Baker v. State, 16 Ariz. App. 463, 494 P.2d 68 (1972); State v. Eldor, 382 So.2d 687, 690
(Fla. 1980); People v. Taravella, 133 Mich. App. 515, 520, 350 N.W.2d 780, 783 (1984); State v.
Camp, 295 S.E.2d 766, 768 (N.C. App. 1982).
40. For example, a Georgia court upheld a state law prohibiting harassing phone calls, explaining
that "the victim's subjective ideas on what is or is not harassing are not in issue. The point is that the
defendant telephones intending to harass and the defendant certainly knows if he is doing that."
Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 598, 255 S.E.2d 710, 713, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979).
41. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
42. The only states to lack such specific laws are California, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
and Rhode Island.
43. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(3) (1986); COLO. REV. STA'r. § 18- 9-111(1)(g)
(1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106 (1)(d) (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4(11) (1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4(a) (West Supp. 1986); PENN. STAT. ANN. 18 § 5540(a)(2) (Purdon
1983); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 9.61.230(2) (1979).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(2) (1986); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 750.540e(c) (West
Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1310 (1)(d) (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-430(3) (Law. Co-
op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 49-31-31(4) (1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(5)
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Some states have addressed the problem more directly. Fifteen states
explicitly regulate calls made by ADRMPs." Some of these states require
the caller to secure the consent of the party called,"' and two states pro-
hibit calls between 9 p.m. and 9 a.m., as well as calls to certain numbers,
such as "public safety" or unlisted numbers."
Local governments have also regulated unsolicited calls. Bedford
Heights, Ohio, for example, passed an ordinance banning all unsolicited
commercial calls."' The promulgation of this type of ordinance, however,
would be unfair to national telemarketers and survey researchers because
of the difficulty of staying informed about the myriad restrictions imposed
locally. Finally, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) believes
the existing AT&T tariffs are an adequate solution to the problem of
"improper or abusive" solicitations.' 9 These tariffs prohibit the "use of
the service in such a manner as to interfere unreasonably with the use of
the service by one or more other [clustomers,"' and most local telephone
companies have identical language in their tariffs.
States have recently sought to extend their regulation of unsolicited tele-
phone calls. In the 1984-85 legislative session, bills on the subject were
introduced in twenty-two states.51 These bills contained four types of
telemarketing regulations. The first type would have offered telephone
service subscribers the option of indicating to potential callers, through
asterisks in the regular directory or the compilation of "no call" lists, their
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
45. The legislation addressing ADRMPs varies among the 15 states. Some laws regulate only
sales calls. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-256e (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-311 (1986); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 365.165(1) (Harrison Supp. 1984); Idaho P.U.C. Order No. 19793-Case No. U-
1500-158 (July 8, 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 78 § 55C (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
484.125(4) (West Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.72 (West Supp. 1986). Alaska regulates only
recorded advertisements. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.472 (1986). Arkansas regulates sales calls and those
used for any purpose in political campaigns. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4162 (1985 Supp.). The others
apply to all calls. CAL.. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2875 (West Supp. 1986); Idaho P.U.C. Order No.
19793-3-Case No. U-1500-158 (July 8, 1985); Mo. CODE REcS. tit. 4 § 240-32.090 (1978); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 87-307 - 87-310 (1985); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c § 87B (Vernon Supp.
1986) and Tex. P.U.C. Sub. Rules § 23.61(h) (1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-425.1 (Supp. 1986). North
Carolina, however, treats the different types of ADRMP calls, commercial and noncommercial, differ-
ently. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-30 (1985).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.472(a) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4162 (1985 Supp.); CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 2874(b) (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-311 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 365.165(2) (Harrison Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.125(2)(a) (West Supp. 1986);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-30(b)(3) (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.72(2) (West Supp. 1986).
47. Idaho P.U.C. Order No. 19,793-Case No. U-1500-158 (July 8, 1985); Tex. P.U.C. Sub.
Rules § 23.61 (h)(2)(iii) & (iv) (1985).
48. Bedford Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 76-45 (March 2, 1976). These municipal ordinances are
usually passed to protect consumers against fraud rather than to protect their privacy.
49. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C. 2d 1023, 1037 (1980).
50. Id.
51. See Crocker, States Take Aim at Telemarketers, ZIP TARGET MARKETING, July 1985, at 8.
More recent data on regulation in this area is compiled in In Session, published by Walker Informa-
tion Network, Pleasant Hill, Missouri.
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desire to avoid unsolicited calls.5" The second type of proposed regulation
sought to ban or regulate ADRMP calls.5" The third type would have
restricted the hours for making unsolicited calls, 4 and the fourth type
sought to establish registration regulation for unsolicited calls."
B. Key Issues
This section discusses five major issues to be addressed when construct-
ing a regualtory regime to control unsolicited phone calls: defining
"unsolicited calls;" distinguishing among types of unsolicited calls; re-
stricting the hours for such calls; establishing and allocating the costs of
any regulatory solution; and regulating by state or federal law.
1. Defining Unsolicited Calls
The first problem facing all proposals is the difficulty of defining
"unsolicited telephone calls." 6 The definition should take into account
several factors: whether the call has been implicitly solicited, or made to a
business, or made by a caller having a prior relationship with the
recipient.
Solicited calls do not disturb the privacy of recipient, so they are
expressly excluded by state statutes regulating unsolicited calls." These
exclusions apply both to calls actively solicited by consumer requests and
to calls that are implicitly solicited, such as those providing information to
consumers about prior purchases.' Determining whether a call is implic-
itly solicited is fairly simple; any call offering information directly relating
to a prior transaction of the party called and of apparent interest to that
party has been implicitly solicited.
Although most social calls are unsolicited, general harassment statutes
regulate such calls when they become disturbing. 9 The regulations
52. Crocker, supra note 51. Such bills were introduced in Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, New
York, and Ohio, and one that applies only to ADRMPs was introduced in Nebraska.
53. Id. at 8-9. Such bills were proposed in Arizona, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wash-
ington, Wyoming, Maryland, and Tennessee.
54. Id. at 9. A Virginia measure proposed to allow computer dialed calls only between 9 a.m, and
9 p.m.; the New York assembly considered a measure banning all telephone solicitation calls between
5 p.m. to 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. to 8 a.m.
55. Id. at 9. Such bills were introduced in California, Wyoming, and Indiana.
56. Following a three year investigation the FCC noted that "[tihe term 'unsolicited telephone
call' does not have a precise, generally accepted definition" and then defined it loosely as "a business
call from an organization with which the recipient has had minimal if any prior dealings [but not]
...unwelcome personal calls or misdialed calls." Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023,
1029 n.9 (1980).
57. See, e.g., ARK. STA'r. ANN. § 41-4162 (1985 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.165(2) (Harri-
son Supp. 1984); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 484.125(7) (West Supp. 1986).
58. See statutes cited supra note 57.
59. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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discussed here should not apply to calls made by social acquaintances of
the party called. 60 Similarly, it does not seem necessary or desirable to
regulate unsolicited business-to-business calls." Individuals do not enjoy
the same degree of privacy at the workplace as they do in their homes. 62
In fact, businesses generally welcome unsolicited commercial calls since
such calls might generate business contacts. Furthermore, secretaries and
receptionists can screen out any undesired telephone calls.
Calls from institutions with a prior relationship with the recipient are
more difficult to categorize. The FCC offers three examples of such calls:
"A caller requesting a contribution on behalf of the called party's alma
mater or a hospital where that person has been a patient . . . [or] a store
...calling a long-time customer to inform him of a sale."16 3 If the person
calling on behalf of such an institution is also a classmate or friend, the
call would be considered personal rather than unsolicited and would be
treated like the personal calls. Of course, it is not always clear where to
draw the line, and the FCC recognizes that if it attempted to do so, diffi-
cult First Amendment problems might result.64 One solution might be to
require such callers to request consent for future calls when they initially
request the recipients' telephone numbers. Consent for such calls might
even be presumed when the individuals provide their telephone numbers,
so long as the institution offers them the option of not receiving such
calls. 65
2. Distinguishing Among Types of Unsolicited Calls
Whether regulations should treat different types of unsolicited calls dif-
ferently is another important question. The debate on this issue has
generally focussed on whether noncommercial calls should be made ex-
empt from regulation, but calls may be distinguished based on other rele-
vant characteristics. Once a method for classifying phone calls has been
adopted, there remains the issue of who should determine which types of
calls are more desirable than others.
60. This would permit an insurance sales representative to call old school acquaintances to try to
sell them insurance, but such minor intrusions would seem de minimus.
61. Close to half of all telemarketing calls are business-to-business. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4.
62. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
63. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1036 (1980).
64. Id. at 1036.
65. Institutions might even compile lists of telephone numbers for sale to others, so long as they
inform the solicited individuals that they intend to sell their lists and that those using the list would
enjoy the same calling status as the institution (i.e., they would not be unsolicited callers). Individuals
should have the option of not releasing their numbers for that purpose.
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a. Categorizing Calls
Non-commercial callers argue that they should be exempt from regula-
tion for two reasons. First, restrictions on non-commercial calls would
severely impair information gathering capabilities of organizations."' In
particular, polling organizations claim that such restrictions might ruin
them entirely." Survey researchers and pollsters also claim that they
deserve greater freedom than commercial calls because their activity is
more important than commercial calls to our democratic way of life. 8
Second, non-commercial callers contend that people find surveys less dis-
turbing than sales pitches. 9 Empirical evidence supports this claim."0
Moreover, pollsters claim that telephone subscribers consider surveys to be
more valuable than commercial calls. 7 1
Prominent commentators agree that noncommercial callers should not
be regulated. In his comments to the FCC, Walter Baer, who was respon-
sible for petitioning the FCC to conduct a study, argues in favor of a
distinction between commercial calls and those made for political or other
noncommercial purposes.72 In sponsoring the 1977 Privacy Act, Represen-
tative Les Aspin explicitly exempted noncommercial calls. 7 1 Many state
regulations do likewise.7 4
However, other factors argue against distinguishing between commer-
cial and non-commercial calls.7 5 It has been pointed out that survey callers
are often seeking information from individuals which the caller later sells,
66. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1028 (1980) ("prohibitions on calls to sub-
scribers with unlisted numbers or those who have indicated a desire not to receive unsolicited calls
would produce serious distortions in the information gathered")..
67. Address by John Rupp, attorney for Council of American Survey Research Organizations
(CASRO), Columbia University Center for Telecommunications & Information Studies Symposium,
"Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy," Columbia Business School (Feb. 7, 1986)
[hereinafter Rupp Address] (transcript on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Field Report, supra note 6, at 9.
71. Rupp Address, supra note 67.
72. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1026 (1980).
73. The Telephone Privacy Act limited its reach to commercial calls, defined as follows:
The term 'commercial telephone call' means (under regulations of the Commission) any call
made for business purposes by or on behalf of any business enterprise, other than a call made
by an organization described in paragraph (3) [labor], (4) [agricultural], or (5) [horticultural]
of section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue code of 1954 on its own behalf, by a political organi-
zation, or by a public opinion polling, or radio or television audience rating, organization.
S. 2193, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoN(;. REc. 33,371-72 (1977).
74. See statutes cited supra note 45. Others making the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial calls include former U.S. Senator Paula Hawkins. After convincing the Florida State
Legislature in 1978 to outlaw ADRMP calls for commercial purposes (she chaired the state's Public
Service Commission at the time), she used ADRMPs in her unsuccessful reelection campaign to the
Senate in 1986. See COMM. WEEK, Oct. 20, 1986, at 60, col. 3.
75. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1028 (1980).
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returning no benefit to the individual, as opposed to sales callers who hope
to enter into a mutually beneficial transaction."" Furthermore, various
groups have contended that differential treatment would be unlawful."
The FCC has endorsed the following position:
[E]xempting calls made for political and charitable solicitation or
survey research purposes from regulations applicable to commercial
sales calls would also appear to raise serious constitutional questions
... .We have no information that subscribers would find an adver-
tising message more offensive than a request for a charitable contri-
bution or a political message or solicitation. As the Court noted in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977), "the con-
sumers' concern for the free flow of commercial speech may often be
far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue." 8
b. Individuals' Preferences
A former representative of a photo portrait company tells a story about
a presentation he made to a consumer protection group in Pennsylvania."
After most of the group indicated to him that they would choose not to
receive unsolicited calls, he asked how many of them or their children had
sat for portraits with his company. Since this community was in his for-
mer territory, he was not surprised to find that many had. When he asked
how many in this latter group had been contacted by his company
through unsolicited phone calls, most admitted that they had. He pointed
out to these people that they would not have been contacted if they had
prohibited all unsolicited calls. Confronted by this dilemma, most
explained that, actually, they were only disturbed by a small number of
unsolicited calls and would prefer that only those be excluded.
Many caller groups believe their position is similar to that of the por-
trait photo company, and think it is unfair to lump them together with
other unsolicited callers. If forced to make an all-or-nothing choice
between receiving or not receiving unsolicited calls, telephone subscribers
might exclude desirable calls to protect themselves from irritating ones.
76. Address by Morey McDaniel, Columbia University Center for Telecommunications & Infor-
mation Studies Symposium, "Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy," Columbia Busi-
ness School (Feb. 7, 1986) (transcript on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
77. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1025 (comments of Georgetown Institute for
Public Interest), 1027 (comments of various business and industry associations), and 1029 (comments
of AT&T).
78. Id. at 1035.
79. Conversation with Fred Tregaskis, Campaign Communications Institute of America (July
1985).
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The best solutions to the telemarketing problem would thus allow indi-
viduals to select the types of calls they receive, rather than presenting
them with an all-or-nothing choice. As discussed in Part 1,80 if the govern-
ment were to decide which calls were desirable, significant constitutional
problems would arise. The statute, which allows individuals to refuse mail
that they find "erotically arousing or sexually provocative,""1 avoids the
First Amendment problem because all discretion is left with the individual
and not reviewable by any government officials.8"
Similarly, permitting individuals to choose what types of calls to
exclude is desirable. The government might propose categories such as the
following: solely informational calls, sales or contribution related calls,
non-profit calls, commercial calls, and reminders. These categories would
help individuals select exactly the degree of privacy they desired. Individu-
als might choose to exclude all calls, all but "non-profit" calls, only "sales
or contribution related" calls, or any combination of these five types of
unsolicited calls.
A directory could be compiled using code numbers to indicate the most
commonly used instructions or distinctions (such a directory is described
in Part III)."8 The use of multiple code symbols might look bizarre,8 but
the list could always be kept on-line in a computer capable of using the
codes to customize a list for any telemarketer.
In accordance with this approach no government body would be
involved in deciding the types and scopes of categories. The government
would select the most appropriate categories for coding, but any category
could be chosen by any consumer. Juries would enforce subscriber prefer-
ences in suits alleging that a caller had violated the express wishes of the
80. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
81. 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1980).
82. As the Supreme Court said when evaluating that Act in Rowan v. Postmaster, 397 U.S. 728,
737 (1977), "Congress provided this sweeping power not only to protect privacy but to avoid possible
constitutional questions that might arise from vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation
of the material in a governmental official."
Armed with this wide discretion, some people during the late 1960's and early 1970's sought to stop
advertising mailings from firms engaged in Vietnam War related activities, which they considered to
be obscene. Courts upheld their right to do so. Baer, Controlling Unwanted Communications to the
Home, TI.ICOMMUNIC'ATIONS Po'Y, Sept. 1978, at 218, 222.
83. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
84. This was one of the fears expressed by the California Public Utilities Commission which led
to the asterisk approach in the McDaniel case. The Commission observed that:
If an asterisk listing were ordered, even McDaniel concedes that there would be many
problems in establishing an acceptable general description of which calls are deemed unaccept-
able . . . . Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company contends that if McDaniel is entitled
to an asterisk for his particular dislikes, others would be entitled to symbols for theirs, and that
the telephone book would have a myriad of stars, circles, ampersands, and other symbols which
would be confusing and have no practical effect.
McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. and Tel., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 47, 56 (1965).
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individual. Such a dispute would be analogous to a suit for trespass in
which a homeowner posts a sign prohibiting door-to-door solicitation and
then charges a solicitor with ignoring the sign. These controversies would
not be of constitutional dimension unless a subscriber sought to discrimi-
nate among callers according to some criteria like race or sex, in which
case the prohibition would not be enforceable.8"
c. ADRMP Versus Live Calls
Some states have attempted to solve the problem of undesired unsolic-
ited calls by regulating only unsolicited calls made by ADRMPs,8" and a
number of proposed bills would have continued that distinction."7
Although such legislation might withstand an equal protection chal-
lenge, 8 it would place great weight on a relatively minor difference and
solve only part of the problem of unsolicited calls. Even though subscrib-
ers may be more averse to ADRMP calls, a comprehensive solution would
be better public policy. An ADRMP ban would stifle some communica-
tors; others would simply shift to more expensive live calls. To the extent
that ADRMPs are less expensive, legislators should protect access to that
medium so that speakers with relatively less wealth can assert their right
to free expression.
3. Restricting Hours of Unsolicited Calls
As mentioned above, regulations restricting unsolicited calls to particu-
lar hours have been adopted in two states8 and are being considered by
several more.90 AT&T supported such regulation in testimony before the
FCC.9 This type of regulation is analogous to regulations restricting
hours for door-to-door sales.'
Hourly restrictions on unsolicited telephone calls are likely to be upheld
as constitutional time-place-and-manner regulations under the same rea-
soning used to uphold regulation of door-to-door sales. 8 The least drastic
85. The 14th Amendment forbids the government from enforcing discrimination based on prohib-
ited criteria. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
86. See supra note 45.
87. See supra note 53.
88. Underinclusiveness does not necessarily imply unconstitutionality. See Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) ("It is no requirement of equal protection that all
evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all").
89. See supra note 47.
90. See supra note 54.
91. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1029 (1980).
92. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
93. See Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1036-37 (1980). One of the justifications
for hourly limits on door-to-door sales was that such limits make night burglars more conspicuous. See
Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs and Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1984)
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means test, however, might require that this type of regulation be invali-
dated due to the existence of a less drastic alternative requiring individual
identification.
One complication of hourly restrictions arises because many individuals
have non-traditional work schedules and sleep during the day. Should
these people be subject to unsolicited calls while asleep and denied them
during their waking hours? Were there no practical way to accommodate
these non-traditional schedules, then the inadequacies of a reasonable
compromise would have to be tolerated. But there is a solution; in a direc-
tory like the one discussed above, individuals could specify the hours they
prefer to receive calls as well as the types of calls they wish to receive.
Subscribers might find it useful, for example, to require that there be no
calls during their particular dinner hour, no calls before noon, no calls on
weekdays, or no calls on weekend mornings.
4. Establishing and Allocating Costs of Regulation
The cost of compliance with the proposed legislative rules may be sig-
nificant. Who should shoulder that cost? The First Amendment does not
permit callers to be saddled with unreasonably taxing obligations, nor
does it permit receptive subscribers to be burdened by extra duties. The
right of privacy would presumably include the right to enjoy privacy with-
out incurring excessive expenses.
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue,94 the Supreme Court struck down a tax directed at newspapers
because it constituted an unconstitutional burden on the First Amendment
right of free speech. With regard to unsolicited telephone calls, Minneapo-
lis Star suggests that the Court would find a scheme which burdens call-
ers with excessive costs unconstitutional.9" The case also indicates that it
would not be appropriate to require special tariffs for unsolicited calls or
ADRMP usage.96 Today, however, the availability of inexpensive
(demonstration of significant incidence of burglary and home invasion that justified limit on hours of
door-to-door solicitation).
94. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
95. Although the Supreme Court has not yet accepted the argument, regulations burdening inex-
pensive forms of expression may be particularly suspect. As Justice Black noted in his dissent in
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), a ban on loudspeakers would have a disproportionate impact
on those with smaller budgets and "there are many people who . . . do not have enough money to
own or control publishing plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show
places." 336 U.S. at 102. The California Supreme Court endorsed this position in Wollam v. City of
Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481 (1963), recognizing that "in certain circumstances the
sound truck may be the only practical means for communication of opinion; alternative modes . . .
may be prohibitively expensive, not available, or not effective." Id. at 284, 379 P.2d at 486.
96. This was the position of the FCC in its inquiry into unsolicited calls. Unsolicited Telephone
Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1038 n.27 (1980). The FCC explained:
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computers and database programs makes it possible to regulate unsolicited
calls without incurring a cost that would be an unconstitutional burden on
the caller. If a solution involving a no solicitation list were implemented,
an industry trade group or private firm might be established to compare
callers' lists against a master list of those desiring no calls. 97
The Court has generally been opposed to regulations that impose eco-
nomic burdens on willing recipients of messages. For example, in Lamont
v. Postmaster General 8 the Court struck down a rule that placed an
affirmative obligation on addressees to fill out a form before they could
receive mail considered to be communist propaganda. Using similar rea-
soning, the FCC concluded that it would be unlawful to prohibit unre-
quested contacts to the home "absent an appropriate indication that the
householder does not want to be disturbed."" It is unlikely that the Court
would uphold the proposed legislation that would require a subscriber's
affirmative consent before he or she could be called.100
There remains the issue of what burdens may be placed on those who
wish to maintain their privacy. The 1977 Telephone Privacy Act provided
that a telephone company cannot charge a subscriber for listing him as
unwilling to receive unsolicited commercial calls; the cost of this service
must be borne by the entities obtaining the phone lists.' 1 Yet, in other
contexts those desiring privacy shoulder at least part of the cost. Most
local telephone companies add a surcharge for having an unlisted tele-
phone number.'0 2 Courts have required homeowners who wish to be
protected from undesired door-to-door sales to purchase signs proclaiming
their distaste for interruptions.'0 8
There does not appear to be a constitutional issue raised by requiring
those who wish to avoid certain telephone calls to pay a reasonable
The costs to the telephone network for a particular message would appear to have no relation
to the content of the message, the fact that it was unsolicited, or its placement through use of
an ADRMP. . . .To the extent that unsolicited telephone calling organizations generate
large calling volumes, they pay for such usage in the same way as any other subscriber.
d.
97. Callers and mailers generally prefer not to contact those who strongly object to their presence
because such contacts waste time and resources. Yet, maintaining systems like the Telephone or Mail
Preference Services and purging lists of unreceptive individuals involves substantial costs. Depending
on the size of the lists, it may be less expensive to send direct mail to all members of multiple lists
than to merge and purge duplicate names.
98. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
99. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1035 (1980).
100. See supra note 50; see also Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1029 (1980)
(AT&T "expressed doubts concerning the lawfulness of a prohibition on unsolicited calls to telephone
subscribers who have not affirmatively indicated a desire to receive them").
101. S. 2193, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 33,371-72 (1977).
102. For example, New York Telephone charges an extra twenty dollars per year. NYNEX
WHITE PAGES MANHA-1-T-AN 10 (1985-1986).
103. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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amount to cover the cost of administering a "no call" system. Consumers
might be asked to pay for special listings in the telephone book, special
telephone equipment, or operating company services. Alternatively, locali-
ties could finance or subsidize the process.104
5. Regulating by State or Federal Law
Although the problem of protecting telephone subscribers against unde-
sired unsolicited telephone calls is nationwide and thus may be susceptible
to a single remedy, the FCC may not have the statutory authority to pro-
mulgate a national regulatory solution. The Supreme Court has recently
interpreted the Communications Act of 1934105 to forbid the FCC from
preempting legislation by the states in matters involving "charges, classifi-
cations, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection
with intrastate communication. 0 6
Despite the Supreme Court's position, several groups favor regulatory
uniformity.1 07 Both the National Association of Regulatory Utility Com-
missioners and the Missouri Public Service Commission requested that a
Federal-State Joint Board be convened pursuant to Section 410 of the
Communications Act to investigate these matters.1 8 Ideally, this inquiry
would lead to the endorsement of a model Telephone Privacy Act which
could be enacted separately in each state, in whole or with slight
modification.
One advantage of a national model act is that the industry might be
more receptive to proposals by a single, national group with special exper-
tise in telecommunications. Presumably, such a group would understand
the industry's concerns and would probably not burden them with ineffi-
cient regulations. If a model act were formulated and endorsed by such a
group, the group's credibility would help ensure that their version of the
act would be adopted by state legislatures with minimal modification.
Industry groups would be more likely to support the model act if they
believed it would result in uniform regulation nationally.
104. A similar funding proposal was made concerning "no solicitation" signs. See Note, Strangers
in the Night: Ordinances Restricting the Hours of Door-to-Door Solicitation, 63 WASH U.L.Q. 71,
85-86 n.117 (1985).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1983).
106, Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 106 S.Ct. 1890 (1986). Congress could amend
the Communications Act of 1934 to give the FCC this power pursuant to its power under the Com-
merce Clause.
107. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1026 (1980) (advocates of regulation in-
clude individuals, state agencies, and the FTC).
108. Id. at 1026.
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III. Suggested Solutions
Two types of solutions appear to provide privacy for the consumer with
a minimal hindrance to callers: no solicitation directories, which would
limit the making of unwanted unsolicited calls, and new telephone tech-
nologies, which would enable subscribers to screen unwanted calls. Before
describing these proposed solutions, this Part reviews some existing
alternatives.
A. Existing Alternatives
There are three existing alternatives to the unsolicited calls problem.
First, individuals may choose to have unlisted numbers. Second, asterisks
may be placed by phone directory listings of those who do not want unso-
licited calls. Finally, an industry group of telemarketers operates a service
which enables individuals to indicate to participating national
telemarketers that they do not want unsolicited sales calls by listing their
numbers with the group.
1. Unlisted Numbers
Individuals with unlisted numbers can secure partial protection from
undesired unsolicited calls, but these individuals forfeit some desired calls
as well. Furthermore, this protection is incomplete because an unlisted
number does not prevent all unsolicited calls; sequential dialers call
unlisted numbers, and many telemarketers obtain phone numbers from
sources other than directories.1 °9
Unsolicited calls to unlisted numbers could be made illegal, but that
might encourage more subscribers to remove their names from directories
at a higher cost to themselves as well as to the telephone company, whose
operators presumably would be burdened with additional requests for
those unlisted numbers. Meanwhile, some subscribers with unlisted num-
bers might not mind receiving some types of unsolicited calls, such as calls
reminding them of important events like elections or soliciting contribu-
tions for charitable organizations.
2. Asterisks in Regular Directories
The placement of asterisks by phone directory listings to indicate that
unsolicited calls are unwelcome was first proposed in 1964 by Stanford
Law School student Morey McDaniel."' He predicted that many callers
109. See Note, Regulation of Unsolicited Telephone Calls: An Argument for a Liability Rule, 5
COMPUT ER L.J. 393, 397 n.36 (1985).
110. McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 47, 51 (1965). McDan-
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would comply voluntarily with such a system, since they would assume
that calls to such individuals would be counterproductive. He also guessed
that civil suits could serve to enforce the regulations."' Many of the pro-
posed bills regulating unsolicited calls recommended the implementation
of a similar asterisk system." 2
The use of asterisks, however, is not a satisfactory solution. Asterisks
are best suited to binary "yes-no" characterizations. It would be more
practical to employ a non-binary code to make more complex and mean-
ingful distinctions among the types of calls. McDaniel also recognized that
more comprehensive "lines of information" could be used by subscribers
immediately below their phone number in the directory to indicate specific
instructions to potential callers." 3
Yet even McDaniel felt that this alternative would not be practical.""
Extra information would add lines, pages, and ounces to the telephone
books, and this information would only be useful to a small number of
callers who generally do not use phone books. Meanwhile, as McDaniel
understood, many subscribers might consider it "churlish" to reveal this
information to every friend, acquaintance, or stranger who happened to
look up their names in the telephone book."'
Some have suggested that identifications be provided in address directo-
ries since these appear to be more widely used by telemarketers."' If
these directories are used by many others besides telemarketers, however,
it would probably be most economical to compile a much smaller, separate
list or directory of only those subscribers who had objections to some type
of unsolicited telephone calls. Publishing these smaller directories would
save money, paper, and unnecessary embarrassment.
iel asked Pacific Telephone to include in its directory an asterisk in front of his name and those of any
other subscribers who so requested and a statement in the front of the directory warning solicitors,
salesmen, canvassers, surveyors, fundraisers, and others not to call those names with an asterisk. The
Commission refused his request because it concluded that the legislature was the proper forum for
McDaniel's proposals. Id. at 50. The legislature, in fact, had failed to act on two previously intro-
duced bills on this subject. Id. at 57.
111. Id. at 52.
112. See supra note 52.
113. McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 47, 60 (1965).
114. Id. at 60-61.
115. Id. at 60. See also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951).
116. Address directories list individuals and their phone numbers by address. They are generally
used to reach all the occupants of a particular neighborhood. PT&T agreed to exclude McDaniel
from its address directory at his request. McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d
(PUR) 47, 57-60 (1965).
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3. The Telephone Preference Service
The most appealing existing solution to the problem of unsolicited calls
is the Telephone Preference Service (TPS) operated by the Direct Mar-
keting Association (DMA). The TPS is modeled after the DMA's Mail
Preference System (MPS) and provides telemarketers with lists of persons
who wish to avoid unsolicited phone calls.' The MPS constructs lists of
individuals who do not want to receive unsolicited mail, and mailers can,
for a fee, receive these lists and remove those names from their master
lists. 1 8 In addition to establishing the TPS, the DMA has attempted to
preempt any legislative action in the area of telemarketing by writing its
own code for ethical telemarketing and by meeting with citizens'
groups. "
After several years of testing, the TPS now has consumers submit their
names to the DMA if they want them to be removed from lists used by
national telemarketers.' ° The service is publicized through news releases,
Action Line print and broadcast reporters, donated advertisements, and
speakers. As of July 1985, the TPS no solicitation list contained 22,000
names. 2 ' To publicize the service, Bell Atlantic in April 1986 began
including information about the TPS in the white page directories of four
of its Chesapeake & Potomac telephone companies.'
117. The Mail Preference Service can be contacted at the Direct Marketing Association Inc., 6
East 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10017.
118. Mailers who pay $175.00 or $275.00 to subscribe to the MPS receive quarterly tapes with
these names and remove them from their lists. Between 1971 and 1983, 511,000 names were collected
for the removal list, including 46,000 added in 1983 (the most recent year for which figures were
available). Conversation with Jeane Ross, Director of Ethics and Consumer Affairs, Direct Market-
ing Association, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 10, 1985). Since 1974 the MPS has also offered consumers
the option of adding their names to additional mailing lists to receive more direct mail. 592,000 names
have been submitted for this purpose, including 115,000 in 1983. Id.
119. The DMA guidelines for telemarketing include rules suggesting that calls be made during
reasonable hours; that ADRMPs not be used unless they release the line immediately after the called
party hangs up; that names of those who do not want to be called be removed from one's list; and that
callers refrain from contacting those with unlisted or unpublished numbers unless a prior relationship
exists. DIREC--I MARKI,:TING ASSOACATION, GUIDELINES FOR TELEPHONE MARKETING.
The DMA's code of ethics includes another method for limiting the number of undesired contacts.
The code requests that catalogers offer customers an opportunity to withhold their names from the
mailing lists they rent out. For example, the Fall 1984 Lands' End catalog advises that: "We make
our mailing list available to carefully screened companies whose products and services might be of
interest to you. If you would prefer not to receive such mailings, please copy your label exactly and
mail to . . ." Similarly, Illinois Bell enclosed a special notice in the bills it sent to subscribers which
asked them to return a short address form if they desired to be removed from the list to be sold. Letter
to the author from Bob Bulmash, consumer advocate, Warrenville, Illinois (Oct. 29, 1985).
120. After several years of testing, including a failed 800 number, the TPS is now operated by
having consumers submit their names to the DMA by mail. Internal memorandum to the Direct
Marketing Association Board of Directors from the DMA Telephone Preference Service Subcommit-
tee (Jan. 9, 1985) (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
121. Conversation with Jeane Ross, Director of Ethics and Consumer Affairs, Direct Marketing
Association, Washington D.C. (Sept. 10, 1985).
122. In the directories for the District of Columbia, Maryland County/Lower Eastern Shore, and
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At present, however, the TPS is not without problems. First, the TPS
is used only by telemarketers, so it can only help consumers seeking to
avoid telemarketing calls. Subscribers have no means of blocking calls
from charities, polling organizations, and those doing survey research.
Second, the TPS is informally run and compliance is voluntary; only
about twenty telemarketing firms participated as of mid-1986.' 23 While
the DMA and many of its members maintain that the industry can regu-
late itself,"2 4 others disagree.12 5 In a survey of telemarketers, 27% thought
the industry unable to regulate itself, for, as one respondent noted, "There
will always be sweatshop type operations which will continue to hurt the
credibility of the rest of us unless regulators step in.' ' 21
On the other hand, ethical telemarketers are understandably concerned
that if they support a narrow piece of legislation prohibiting unethical
practices, the legislation might be amended to include provisions that are
more burdensome for the industry, though perhaps popular with
Western Virginia/Charleston, the information provided reads
How To HANDLE TELEPHONE SAI.IS CAI.IS
1. Find out who is calling.
2. If you think you may be interested, ask the caller to mail information about the offer or
charity.
3. If you are not interested, just cut in and say so.
4. If you don't want to get another call, ask the person to take your name off their list.




6 East 43rd St.
New York, New York 10017.
Bell Atlantic White Pages, District of Columbia 5 (1986); Maryland County/Lower Eastern Shore 2
(1986); West Virginia/ Charleston 4 (1986).
In the Virginia/Fredericksburg directory the information is presented directly beneath a description
of the Code of Ethics endorsed by The Virginia Telephone Solicitation Ethics Council. That entry
reads:
People who do not want to receive home telephone sales calls can ask that their name [sic] be
taken off national advertising mailing lists.
This can reduce the number of calls from many national advertisers but is not likely to affect
telephone sales calls from local businesses.
There is no charge to have your name removed. Consumers should write to: [same address as
above].
Virginia County/Frederickburg White Pages 3 (1986).
123. Conversation with Fred Tregaskis, Campaign Communications Institute of America (Mar.
1986).
124. See Fannin, Will New Laws Hang up Telemarketers?, MARKETING AND MEDIA DECI-
SIONS, May 1985, at 47, 48.
125. According to David Horowitz, host of NBC's "Fight Back" consumer interest program,
"[The industry is not policing itself and there doesn't seem to be a way to go after them." Church &
Eckert, Lawmakers Focus on Key Telemarketing Issues, TELEMARKETING, June 1985, at 12, 14.
126. Lison, Telemarketing Industry: Where We Are-Where We're Going, TELEMARKETING,
July 1985, at 22, 86. Typical responses to the question of whether or not the industry could regulate
itself included: "Too fragmented at this time"; "The telephone like any medium is subject to misuse
and abuse"; and "Too many people, too many things from too many locations." Id.
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telephone subscribers. Moreover, if technologies changed and existing reg-
ulations ceased to be appropriate, it might not be easy to repeal or even
revise the provisions that have been adopted in them.12 7
B. Suggested Remedies
1. No Solicitation Directories
The existence of the TPS proves that it is both reasonable and practical
to compile lists of those who prefer not to receive unsolicited calls and to
use these lists to prevent telemarketers from calling such individuals. Yet
the failure of the trade group to convince all of its members to participate
suggests the need for some formal legal duty that would require all callers
to observe the wishes of telephone subscribers. Since experts in marketing
have been unable to convince each other that the TPS is in their own best
interests, legislation seems necessary. With the addition of some legal com-
pulsion, the TPS model appears to be an excellent way to protect sub-
scriber privacy against undesired calls.
If compliance were mandatory, then a more formal procedure for
implementing a TPS-type scheme would be necessary. A more elaborate
system for distinguishing among types of calls would ensure that the
wishes of consumers are more closely adhered to for administering this
sort of plan. The DMA, however, does not appear eager to accept respon-
sibility. Furthermore, the mandatory no solicitation list would have to be
made available to all at a nominal price.
Local telephone companies could play a major role in compiling a no
solicitation directory. During discussions with subscribers about their list-
ings in the white pages directory, phone companies could inform subscrib-
ers about the existence of a directory for those anxious to avoid unsolicited
calls. In addition to giving the address or phone number of a government
designated list compiler and the cost of a listing," 8 phone companies
might consider acting as compilers themselves. As an experienced direc-
tory publisher of the white and yellow pages with an existing procedure
for billing and collecting funds from subscribers and a desire for addi-
tional revenue, the local telephone company would seem to be an ideal
compiler." 9
127. As one representative of AT&T has noted, "[E]xperience has shown that when we try to
legislate the solution it becomes cumbersome and mainly unworkable. As new technologies are devel-
oped, many times existing regulations are not appropriate." Correspondence from Clarence R. Smith,
Senior Marketing Consultant, AT&T Communications (Feb. 5, 1986).
128. The phone company is already publishing information about the TPS in the front of the
white page directory in a number of Bell Atlantic directories. See supra note 122.
129. Presumably it was such reasoning that led to the selection of the local telephone company for
this task in the 1977 Telephone Privacy Act. See supra note 73.
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Since the compilation of the no solicitation directory would resemble the
procedure for selling one-line classified advertisements, local newspaper
publishers might also be candidates for the assignment. The listings would
simply include subscribers' telephone numbers along with code numbers
representing any special instructions. The cost of one line would surely be
minimal, especially if the entry included merely a seven digit number and
a three digit code.
Although so decentralized a process could make it more difficult for
telemarketers to attain access to the list of prohibited numbers, this need
not be the case. It would be easy for the DMA, the American
Telemarketing Association (ATA), or another private firm to consolidate
the separate lists. The lists should also provide more information about
the preferences of individuals than is contained in the TPS list. Informa-
tion about inclusion on a list to avoid some or all types of unsolicited calls
could be distributed to telephone subscribers when they sign up for tele-
phone service, and annually thereafter as suggested in the 1977 Telephone
Privacy Act.'8 A reply card could be included, or an address or phone
number might be provided for further information. Subscribers could have
the option of spelling out their instructions to unsolicited callers as "lines
of information" listings,' but there would also be the less expensive
option of selecting code numbers to represent their preferences. For exam-
ple, 003 might represent "no calls between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m.;" 015 "no
calls from charitable organizations;" and 142 "only calls from local
organizations."
If telemarketers felt a strong desire to contact those desiring no tele-
phone calls, the list compiler might ask consumers on the list if their
names and addresses could be released. In this way these individuals could
be contacted by mail. Firms could write to them to request permission to
call, perhaps offering a free gift for such permission. The cost of main-
taining this additional address list could be financed by charging
telemarketers who desire to use it.
Individuals should be able to remove their names from no solicitation
lists at no charge; this would be done automatically by the telephone com-
pany when a subscriber terminates service. Frequent updating would
insure that the list did not contain numbers of people who did not object
to receiving unsolicited calls.
Enforcement of preferences as expressed on no solicitation lists may
prove more problematic. When the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion reviewed Morey McDaniel's proposal for asterisks in regular
130. See supra note 73.
131. This idea is similar to the one of Morey McDaniel. See supra note 110.
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directories, it noted that enforcement would be very difficult. It speculated
that voluntary compliance would be minimal, since it would be easier for
telemarketers to contact every number.13 Yet this reasoning ignores the
fact that it is generally in the industry's best interest to avoid calling those
who do not want to receive calls; sellers do not have unlimited amounts of
time and telephone calls are not free. The best evidence against the Cali-
fornia PUC position is the existence of the MPS and the TPS, both of
which are run voluntarily.
As for those who did not obey voluntarily, the PUC stated that
McDaniel himself conceded that it was impractical to expect asterisk list-
ings to be enforced by civil suits.' 3 However, it is not clear that a litiga-
tion remedy would be unmanageable; such actions would be comparable
to suits for trespass. Unsolicited callers could be required by law to re-
spect the express wishes of those listed in the no solicitation directory, and
calls made in violation of those wishes would be treated as electronic tres-
passes or harassment. 34 Occasional accidental calls to those on "no call"
lists could be handled just like accidental rings of the doorbell at a home
with a "no solicitors" sign. Callers who persistently disturb the subscrib-
ers on the list could be dealt with by local authorities. These suits could
be brought by individuals or district attorneys.
2. Technological Options
Emerging telephone technologies provide two potential remedies in
addition to no solicitation directories: tone devices and so called "CLASS"
technology.
a. Tone Devices
Telephone subscribers could attach tone devices to their phones to
inform unsolicited callers that calls are unwelcome. When turned on, the
device would answer telephone calls by emitting a designated tone which
could be heard by the caller, while delaying the ring of the telephone for a
short interval (perhaps five seconds). Unsolicited callers would be
required to hang up immediately after hearing the tone; thus, their unso-
licited call would never ring. All other callers would also hear the tone,
but they would ignore it. After the short delay, their calls would proceed
normally.
132. 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 47, 55 (1965).
133. Id. at 55.
134. The enforcement of more conventional telephone harassment statutes has apparently not in-
volved insurmountable problems. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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The device could be turned on whenever a subscriber preferred not to
be disturbed by unsolicited calls, and it would not annoy desired callers to
the extent that an explicit message such as "hang up if this is an unsolic-
ited call" would. Its only costs would be those of the device itself and the
time of callers who had to wait for the short delay when the device was
on. CHIP System, a group of former employees of Dun & Bradstreet
Salesnet who are experienced with telemarketing, is developing and seek-
ing a patent for a device with these properties, which they have named
TELL-M.' 35
This device is the telephonic equivalent of a "no solicitors" sign, unob-
trusively warning unsolicited callers not to disturb a subscriber. It also
permits subscribers to preempt annoying calls during any particular hours
they desire. While the simplest form of the device would indicate only that
unsolicited calls were unwelcome, slightly more complicated versions could
emit different tones which might indicate different preferences for various
categories of unsolicited calls. Thus, more sophisticated unsolicited callers
might purchase equipment to tell them whether or not a particular tone
indicates that they must hang up.
The device could be sold at a reasonably low price and might be pro-
vided free to consumers requesting it, if the DMA or local governments
were willing to purchase large quantities and distribute them as a public
service. In fact, the DMA might find it less expensive to distribute the
devices free or at a reduced price than to maintain its TPS.
Those who ignored a warning from the device might be prosecuted
under existing harassment statutes.' Alternatively, legislators might pass
a law expressly prohibiting callers from ignoring such warnings. A viola-
tion of this law might be treated as a trespass or some other minor misde-
meanor, punishable by a small fine.
b. The CLASS Technology
In an excellent 1978 article entitled "Controlling Unwanted Communi-
cations to the Home," Walter Baer explored potential technological
solutions to the problem of unsolicited telephone calls.' Although he was
careful to recognize that consumer demand for different systems was spec-
ulative, and thus their economic feasibility was unclear, Baer strongly
encouraged telephone companies and equipment manufacturers to give se-
rious attention to incorporating the technical capacity for such services
135. Conversation with Lewis L. (Chip) Copley, formerly Vice President, Systems, Dun & Brad-
street Salesnet, Norwalk, Conn. (Jan. 2, 1986).
136. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
137. Baer, supra note 82.
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when they design new switching systems and the "intelligent telephones"
of the future. As Baer explained, each technical approach requires some
physical means of first identifying and then blocking unwanted messages.
He offered suggestions for both.
Today, all telephone rings sound alike to almost all recipients-a call
must be answered before the caller can be identified. Yet, as Baer
explained, it is technically feasible and not very expensive to permit sub-
scribers to distinguish among callers before answering. For example, in
1984 experiments with a system called CLASS (Customer Local Area
Signaling Services), telephone subscribers in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
and Orlando, Florida were able to store a list of numbers in a computer
and the telephone was able to identify whether or not an incoming call
came from one of the numbers listed.138 For an extra charge, a device
could even display the actual number of almost all incoming calls.' 3 9 One
aspect of the system that makes it slightly inefficient in solving the prob-
lem of unsolicited calls is that callers have the option of withholding their
number from the party called. This problem could be remedied easily,
however, by requiring unsolicited callers to forward their numbers.
Subscribers would still not be able to distinguish between unsolicited
commercial calls and calls made by friends from unexpected phone num-
bers-pay phones, for example-not stored in the subscriber's machine.
The first draft of the this author's study suggested that unsolicited callers
might be required to use phone numbers that were specially designated
for such use in their Local Access and Transport Area, for instance, num-
bers with fourth and fifth digits of 00. Alternatively, it was suggested that
unsolicited callers be required to identify themselves by dialing an extra
digit after the regular number. Unfortunately, neither of these plans
appears to be very practical. Even if the first option were implemented
gradually, many people currently using such designated phone numbers
would be inconvenienced."' The second is unworkable under the current
138. See Hirschman, Swinehart & Todd, LASS: Putting the Telephone Customer in Charge,
BELt. LABs RE:., May 1985, at 10; see also Robbins, New Service Proposes to make Phones the
Servants of Users, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1984, at 30, col. 1.
139. It should be noted, however, that the equipment required to display the incoming number is
classified as customer premise equipment (CPE), and local telephone companies are prohibited from
providing such equipment. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), on reconsideration,
Amendment of Second Computer Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981).
140. Implementation of this system would require the selection of specially designated telephone
code numbers for use by unsolicited callers. Because local calls are less expensive than toll calls, the
majority of unsolicited calls would presumably originate within the local calling area of the recipient
and selection of code numbers could be left to the local telephone companies (in their tariffs) or state
Public Utility Commissions.
Still, because telemarketers make significant use of WATS lines, national uniformity would be
advantageous. It would certainly not hurt for the states collectively to discuss this matter. In fact, it
would probably be desirable for a National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners commit-
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North American Numbering Plan since the only tones sent over the lines
before the called party answers are the ten digits of a telephone num-
ber. 14 Instead, it might be practical for the telephone company to require
all unsolicited callers to register the numbers they use. This list could be
stored in a database so the telephone company (or a private firm) could
offer consumers the service of screening out calls from numbers listed in
this database.
If this screening service could be operated as a monopoly service by the
local phone company, it could be offered at a regulated rate. If, however,
it were possible for competitive firms to interface with the local switching
mechanism, then rates could be set by competition. Meanwhile, terminal
equipment might be designed to access and store the numbers from the
database (possibly during early morning hours) and also might be used to
screen out such calls automatically.
This scheme could be expanded to allow subscribers to distinguish
among different types of unsolicited calls. Under such a plan each unsolic-
ited caller would identify itself by a code number. For example, code
number "1" might stand for non-profit callers; "2" for commercial sales
callers; "12" for local politicians, "34" for market researchers, and so
forth. Subscribers could then screen out all unsolicited calls except, for
example, those coming from non-profit callers and local politicians by
blocking all calls from numbers on the list except those from numbers
with codes "1" and "12."
Once consumers identify the calls, they can treat them as they prefer.
Subscribers to the CLASS system could be alerted by a distinctive ring for
certain pre-selected numbers, permitting subscribers to ignore unwanted
calls without missing desired calls.142 Subscribers could also establish a list
of calls to be blocked, so that callers from such numbers received the
recorded message: "At this time the party whose number you're calling is
not accepting your call." The subscriber's phone need not even ring. 141
Using the codes associated with the numbers of unsolicited callers,
screening services could treat different categories of calls differently, as
dictated by the subscriber. Thus, a resident might program her telephone
to block all calls from telephone numbers in the database with code "2"
(commercial sales), record on an answering machine (without ringing) all
such calls with a code "34" (market research), and let the phone ring, but
tee or FCC group to recommend informally a single set of code numbers and an implementation
procedure.
141. Conversation with Raymond Cooper, Bell Core, Administrator of the North American Num-
bering Plan for the United States (Dec. 1985).
142. See Hirschman, Swinehart & Todd, supra note 138, at 10.
143. See Robbins, supra note 138, at 30.
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with a specially designed ring, for all other unsolicited calls (numbers on
the database with all other codes).
Allocating the cost of such a screening service raises economic and con-
stitutional issues. If market failure forced regulators to set the price, they
would have to decide whether to price it as a luxury service and try to
secure extra revenues to be used to subsidize other basic services, or
whether to price it at cost, regarding it as protecting a fundamental right
of privacy. While consumers would balk if asked to pay for what they
regard as a right, they might accept their local government's use of gen-
eral tax revenues to fund the cost of the service.14' Another option is to
incorporate the cost into basic local rates, though higher rates might prove
politically troublesome.
When CLASS systems will become generally available is a matter of
speculation. Illinois Bell engineers claim that CLASS may never be im-
plemented in some communities, including about half of Chicago, due to
the cost of upgrading current equipment. 1 5 Results from test markets,
however, suggest that 10-20% of the country could have access within a
year or two, half the country within four or five years, and almost the
entire country within ten years. 146
Conclusion
Undesired unsolicited telephone calls are an irritating problem for
many people. At the same time, however, many other recipients of the
calls and those who make them find them very valuable. Therefore, any
response to the problems they create must balance the interests of those
who despise them with the interests of those who benefit from making and
receiving them.
The constitutional considerations make it clear that the legal responses
most likely to be upheld are those most narrowly tailored, leaving to each
individual, rather than a government body, the decisions of what types of
unsolicited calls are desirable (or undesirable) and when it would be pref-
erable to receive such calls. A review of the specific issues raised by
attempts at regulation suggests that the best solutions to the problem will
take into account all unsolicited calls, not just commercial calls or calls
144. It appears to be unconstitutional to impose such burdens on individual callers. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
145. According to engineers at Illinois Bell, CLASS will never be implemented in communities
with IESS, SXS and XBAR offices. In addition, they feel that it is currently too expensive to imple-
ment CLASS in IAESS offices, the type serving about 50% of the lines in the Chicago LATA. Corre-
spondence from Bob Willenborg, Illinois Bell (Nov. 26, 1985).
146. Conversation with Butch Hutchinson, Coordinator of the CLASS experiment for Universal
Data System (July 1985).
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made by ADRMPs. In addition, telephone subscribers should be given the
opportunity to distinguish among the types they do not wish to
receive-sales calls, surveys, or charitable solicitations-rather than facing
an all-or-nothing choice. Ideally, new telephone technologies will provide
such an individualized remedy with a minimum of government regulation.
The development of CLASS technology would allow subscribers to block
calls from unsolicited callers, while tone devices could serve as "no solici-
tors" signs for callers.
If the problem of undesired unsolicited telephone calls were insignifi-
cant and increasing slowly it would not require a legal response before
such technological solutions became available. However, the recent regula-
tory activity at the state level indicates that the demand for action is sig-
nificant and increasing. One solution currently available is the no solicita-
tion directory. The directory, which is modeled after the DMA's
Telephone Preference Service, would be legally required and would allow
consumers to select which types of unsolicited calls they desire. Until the
telemarketing problem can be resolved through telephone technology, this
type of directory is the best available solution.
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